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CIVIL RIGHTS - "A MERE PAPER GUARANTEE?": CONGRES­
SIONAL INTENT, JUDICIAL MANIPULATION, AND THE CURRENT 
STATE OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Norman Jett made a somewhat unlikely Civil Rights plaintiff.! 
Jett, a white man, was employed by the Dallas Independent School 
District ("DISD") and worked at South Oak Cliff High School 
("South Oak") as a teacher, athletic director, and head football 
coach. During Jett's career, the school's racial composition had 
gradually changed from predominantly white to predominantly 
black, so Jett was considered a racial minority when Dr. Frederick 
Todd, a black man, was hired as principal. 
Todd and Jett clashed on many issues, but most significant was 
their disagreement about the way that Jett ran the football pro­
gram. In March 1983, tensions came to a head and Todd recom­
mended that Jett be relieved of his position at South Oak. The 
superintendent followed the principal's recommendation. Jett was 
transferred to another school in the district, but his new position did 
not include coaching responsibilities. In May 1983, Jett filed a law­
suit in federal district court alleging that Todd and the DISD had 
constructively discharged him and had violated his due process, 
equal protection, and First Amendment rights. His underlying 
claim was that Todd's actions were motivated by racism: Todd 
transferred Jett because he was white. Jett formally resigned from 
his tenure in August 1983, after twenty-six years of teaching. 
Jett brought his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 ("§ 1981")2 
and 1983 ("§ 1983").3 Section 1981 is based on the first section of 
1. All facts are taken from lett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). 
2. At the time of Jett's trial, § 1981 provided: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro­
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi­
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, 
and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
42 U.S.c. § 1981 (2004). 
3. § 1983 provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
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the Act of 1866: the first national civil rights statute.4 In its modern 
form, § 1981 is used to supplement Title VII discrimination actions 
in both the public and private sector.5 There are real advantages to 
litigating a claim under § 1981 when compared with Title VII: 
§ 1981 is not limited to employers of fifteen or more;6 it is not con­
fined by a short statute of limitations;7 § 1981 does not place a cap 
on damages;8 and it does not require plaintiffs to exhaust adminis­
trative remedies before seeking judicial relief.9 Section 1983, de­
rived from section one of the Ku Klux Act of 1871,10 enables 
plaintiffs to bring a claim against persons who, when acting under 
color of law, violate federally protected rights.n 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni­
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004). 
4. Kelly J. Andrews, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Deconstruction of a 
Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Statute, 35 How. L.J. 403,403-04 (1992). 
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (stat­
ing that a plaintiff may supplement a Title VII claim with a § 1981 claim); Mark S. 
Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination 
Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. I, 26 
(1989). 
6. 42 U.S.c. § 20ooe(b) (2004). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2004). 
8. 42 U.S.c. § 1981(b)(3) (2004); Jan W. Henkel, Discrimination by Supervisors: 
Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 49 FLA. L. REv. 
767, 787 (1997) (discussing whether Congress intended for supervisors to be held indi­
vidually liable for violations of Title VII). 
9. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (2004). See also, e.g., lohnson, 421 U.S. at 460; Brodin, 
supra note 5, at 26. Both § 1981 and Title VII allow a court, in its discretion, to award 
reasonable attorney's fees. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k) (2004). See Nancy L. 
Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of1991: Providing Attorney's Fees 
to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases, 3 ELDER L.J. 341, 354 n.83 
(1995). 
10. For a thorough discussion of historical inaccuracies that have arisen in the 
Supreme Court while discussing the legislative history of the Ku Klux Act, see David 
Achtenberg, A "Milder Measure of Villainy": The Unknown History of42 U.S.C § 1983 
and the Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1999). 
11. See Hon. Harvey Brown & Sarah V. Kerrigan, 42 U.s.C § 1983: The Vehicle 
for Protecting Public Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 619 (1995) 
(generally discussing the ways in which § 1983 operates to protect the rights of public 
employees); Keith E. Eastland, Note, Environmental lustice and the Spending Power: 
Limits on Using Title VI and § 1983, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1601, 1624-25 (2002) 
(describing the analysis by which courts determine whether § 1983 provides a remedy 
for violations of federal rights). Section 1983, which provides a civil remedy for the 
violation of federally protected rights under color of law, is modeled after § 2 of the Act 
of 1866. This section, currently codified at 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2004), outlines criminal 
penalties for the same offenses. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, The Improbable History 
of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 310-11 (2003); 
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At trial, the jury found that Todd and the DISD were indeed 
improperly motivated by Jett's race.12 Todd was found personally 
liable for violating Jett's rights under § 1981, and because Todd was 
an agent of the DISD, the jury also found the DISD vicariously 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.13 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part14 and 
remanded,1s holding that Congress had not intended for § 1981 to 
allow for respondeat superior liability, and therefore the DISD 
could not be held liable for Todd's actions.16 
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on language 
from Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New 
YorkP In dicta, often referred to as Monell Part II, Justice Bren­
nan asserted that Congress had not intended to hold municipalities 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for § 1983 claims.18 
Brennan concluded that under § 1983, a municipality may only be 
held liable for the actions of its employees when the municipality 
has a custom or policy that essentially" 'causes' an employee to vio-
Eric H. Zargans, "Under Color of' What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 
Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 540 (1985). 
12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's 
finding that Todd was liable in his individual capacity for racial discrimination and vio­
lation of Jett's First Amendment rights. Jett v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 
756 (5th Cir. 1986). The majority wrote: 
Jett more than met the normal minimum requirements for a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination by presenting evidence from which the jury could find 
that he, a white, was a member of a racial minority at South Oak Cliff, that he 
was ... exceptionally well ... qualified for the athletic directorlhead football 
coach position, and that on the recommendation of his black superior he was 
replaced by a black who was ... 'substantially less ... qualified. 
Id. 
13. Respondeat superior is "[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable 
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employ­
ment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1053 (7th ed. 2000). 
14. Specifically, the court of appeals reversed the finding that Jett's due process 
rights had been violated. It further found that the jury had insufficient evidence to find 
Jett had been constructively discharged. Jett, 798 F.2d at 748. 
15. The court of appeals determined the trial court had insufficient evidence to 
find the DlSD had been liable for Jett's transfer and remanded this question. The re­
mand was based on the court of appeals' reading of § 1981 as requiring a showing of a 
"custom or policy" of discrimination when bringing § 1981 claims against municipalities. 
Id. at 761-63. 
16. Id. at 762. 
17. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This Note will primarily focus on two parts of Monell: 
Part I [hereinafter Monell Part I], which covered the legislative history of § 1983 and 
determined that municipalities could be considered "persons" under § 1983, and Part II 
[hereinafter Monell Part II], which consisted of dicta and stated that municipalities 
could not be held vicariously liable for their agents' violations of § 1983. 
18. Monell Part II, 436 U.S. at 692. 
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late another's constitutional rights. "19 
Monell was a case that interpreted § 1983, not § 1981; § 1981 
was based on a statute that had been passed earlier than § 1983 and 
covered a much narrower range of conduct.20 Nevertheless, the 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that § 1983 principles of interpretation 
should also apply to § 1981.21 Based on Monell Part II, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that in order for Jett to hold the DISD liable for 
Todd's violations of § 1981, Jett would have to prove that the DISD 
had a custom or policy of discriminating based on race, and that this 
custom or policy had "caused" Todd to violate Jett's constitutional 
rights.22 Clearly, this ruling set the bar rather high for future § 1981 
plaintiffs who were hoping to hold employers liable for the actions 
of their employees. 
But the Fifth Circuit's holding was much more than an applica­
tion of the stricter § 1983 standard to § 1981; this ruling was rather 
novel jurisprudence that ran counter to most courts' understanding 
of § 1981. In fact, other courts faced with this issue had already 
ruled that the Monell Part II dicta did not affect § 1981.23 For in­
stance, in Springer v. Seamen,24 the First Circuit stated that legisla­
tive history indicated that Congress passed § 1981 intending "to 
enact sweeping legislation implementing the thirteenth amendment 
to abolish all the remaining badges and vestiges of the slavery sys­
tem."25 Monell Part II's "custom or policy" requirements, there­
fore, should not be applied to § 1981, as these requirements would 
19. Id. at 692. 
20. lett, 798 F.2d at 762. According to the lett court: 

Unlike section 1983, which only provides a remedy for violations of rights se­

cured by federal statutory and constitutional law, section 1981 provides a 

cause of action for public or private discrimination based on race or alienage. 

Thus, section 1981 is broader than section 1983 in that it reaches private con­

duct, but narrower in that it only provides a remedy for discrimination based 

on race or alienage. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. See, e.g., Dickerson v. City Bank & Trust Co., 590 F. Supp. 714 (D.Kan. 1984); 
Haugabrook v. City of Chicago, 545 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.IlI. 1982); Jones v. Local 520, 
Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs, 524 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.IlI. 1981); Ganguly v. New York 
State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 511 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Croswell v. O'Hara, 
443 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa 1978); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Oper­
ating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa 1978). 
24. 821 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1987). 
25. Id. at 880-81 (quoting Haugabrook v. City of Chicago, 545 F. Supp. 276, 280 
(N.D.Ill. 1982». 
137 2005] 	 A MERE PAPER GUARANTEE? 
improperly narrow its scope.26 The Sixth Circuit, in dictum, had 
also stated that § 1983's requirements did not affect § 1981.27 The 
Fifth Circuit's ruling created a circuit split, and although the "split" 
really only consisted of a few courts, the United States Supreme 
Court determined this issue was ripe for review and granted 
certiorari.28 
Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality of the Supreme Court 
and based her decision on legislative history. After her analysis, 
O'Connor agreed with the Fifth Circuit: § 1981 does not provide an 
independent claim when it is brought against a municipality,29 and 
therefore claims to vindicate § 1981 rights violated by municipali­
ties must be brought through § 1983.30 According to O'Connor, it 
then followed that in claims against municipalities, § 1981 must ad­
here to the custom or policy requirements of § 1983.31 
A. 	 The Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term: Civil Rights Take a 
Backseat 
Jett was not the only controversial civil rights decision to 
emerge from the Supreme Court's 1988-89 term. In fact, Jett was 
not even the only decision to narrow § 1981.32 In this term alone, 
§ 1981, Title VII,33 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,34 
and the Fourteenth Amendment35 were narrowed by decisions36 
26. Id. 
27. Leonard v. City of Frankfort Elec. and Water Plant Bd., 752 F.2d 189, 194 n.9 
(6th Cir. 1985) (dictum). 
28. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 488 U.S. 940 (1988). 
29. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 720 (1989). 
30. Id. at 730. 
31. Id. at 731. 
32. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Court deter­
mined that § 1981 only protected individuals up until the moment a contract was 
formed; protection in the course of performance under a contract was outside the scope 
of § 1981. Id. at 179-80. This ruling received much more attention than lett. 
33. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), overruled in part 
by Civil Rights Act of 1991; see, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 
(1989), overruled by Civil Rights Act of 1991; Johnson v. Rice, CIV.A. 2:85-CV-1318, 
1992 WL 16284 at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 1992); Cota v. Tucson Police Dept., 783 F. 
Supp. 458, 472 n.14 (D. Ariz. 1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 
1305 (N.D. Cal 1992). 
34. Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). Betts 
was later overruled by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990. Theodore W. 
Wem, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the 
ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 
1560 (1999). 
35. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
36. See Peter Brandon Bayer, Patterson and Civil Rights: What Rough Beast 
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that infuriated civil rights groupS.37 Congress responded by passing 
the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act (the "1991 Amend­
ments"), which were primarily intended to strengthen Title VII and 
§ 198138 and to overturn the more controversial Court decisions.39 
B. 	 The 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act: Congress 
Solves One Problem and Creates Another 
Before the 1991 Amendments, the text to § 1981 read: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per­
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and 
exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
Parts (b) and (c) were added in 1991:40 
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined 

For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce con­

tracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and ter­

mination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 

(c) Protection against impairment 
Slouches Towards Bethlehem to be Born?, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 401, 441·58 
(1990) (exploring some of the policy reasons behind the Supreme Court's narrowing of 
Civil Rights in its 1988-89 term). 
37. Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: 
The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 
RUTGERS L. REv. 1,23-24 (1993) (quoting a July 10, 1989 article in the New York Times 
in which Benjamin Hooks, Director of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People ("NAACP"), promised "civil disobedience on a mass scale that has 
never been seen in this country before"). 
38. Sheilah A. Goodman, Trying to Undo the Damage: The Civil Rights Act of 
1990, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1991). 
39. Leigh Ann Gilbert Hodge, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Legislative Re­
sponse to the Supreme Court's Weakening of Civil Rights Remedies in the Workplace, 22 
CUMBo L. REv. 801, 817 n.22 (1992). Congress stated that one of its purposes in enact­
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "[t]o respond to recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide ade­
quate protection to victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
40. 	 Part (b) was added to overturn Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, and Part 
(c) was added to codify Runyon v. McCrary. H.R. REp. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 93 (1991). 
See also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989) (holding that 
§ 1981 did not protect individuals from discrimination in the course of performing a 
contract); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 applies to pri­
vate action). 
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The rights protected by this section are protected against impair­
ment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under 
color of State law.41 
Section (c), intended to ensure that § 1981 would apply equally 
to private and public action,42 is currently at the center of a circuit 
split.43 It is no longer clear whether the Supreme Court's holdings 
in lett remain good law. Some courts have argued that the 1991 
Amendments only overrule lett's first holding by allowing plaintiffs 
to bring § 1981 actions against municipalities independent of 
§ 1983.44 These courts claim that lett's second holding remains 
good law-that is, § 1981 actions, when brought against municipali­
ties, do not allow for respondeat superior liability and must still 
comply with the custom or policy requirements of § 1983. On the 
other side are those courts which claim that the 1991 Amendments 
did not overrule either of lett's holdings.45 Then there are the 
courts that simply declare that lett is overruled but do not offer an 
analysis of the issue.46 
If § 1981 claims may be brought against municipalities without 
41. 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (2004). 
42. H.R. REp. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 92 (1991). It is worth noting that lett's hold­
ings have never applied to § 1981 claims brought against private actors. Arguably, Con­
gress' desire to treat state and private actors equally under § 1981 either (1) evinces its 
intent to overrule lett, or (2) overrules lett by implication. 
43. See Fed'n of African-American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 
1214-15 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the amendment allows a cause of action against 
state actors but preserves Monell requirements); contra Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 
Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that without express language from 
Congress indicating an intent to create an independent federal damages remedy in 
§ 1981, the court is neither willing to imply one or to deviate from lett); Butts v. County 
of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000) (Congress did not express an explicit 
intent to overrule lett, and the court is not willing to imply a cause of action against a 
prior court ruling); Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that lett was unaffected by the amendments). 
44. See, e.g., Fed'n of African American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1214; Powell v. 
City of Pittsfield, 143 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D.Mass. 2001). 
45. See, e.g., Oden, 246 F.3d at 463-64; Butts, 222 F.3d at 894; Dennis, 55 F.3d at 
156 n.1; Anderson v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 
1269 n.8 (S.D.Ala. 1999); Nolen v. City of Chicago, No. 97 C 6608,1998 WL 111675, at 
*5-6 (N.D.IlI. Mar. 4, 1998); Tabor v. City of Chicago, 10 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991-92 
(N.D.Ill. 1998); Johnakin v. City of Philadelphia, ClV.A. 95-1588, 1996 WL 18821, at *4 
(E.D.Pa. Jan. 18, 1996); Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 905 F. Supp. 993, 
995 n.2 (N.D.Ala. 1995). 
46. See Jackson v. City of Chicago, No. 96C 3636,1996 WL 734701, at *8 (N.D.Ill. 
Dec. 18, 1996); Robinson v. Town of Colonie, 878 F. Supp. 387,405 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); 
Morris v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 849 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (D.Kan. 1994); Arnett v. 
Davis County Sch. Dist., No. 92-c-988W, 1993 WL 434053, at *5 (D.Utah Apr 5, 1993); 
Ford v. City of Rockford, No. 88C 20323, 1992 WL 309603 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 15, 1992). 
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§ 1983, but must still meet the § 1983 requirements, then Congress 
has not significantly strengthened § 1981.47 However, Congress has 
significantly strengthened § 1981 if (1) § 1981 may now be brought 
independent of § 1983, and (2) § 1981 no longer requires plaintiffs 
to meet the custom or policy requirements of § 1983 and instead 
allows plaintiffs to rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
This Note argues that the reasoning relied upon in the Jett deci­
sion was flawed. However, even if Jett remains intact as a reasona­
ble interpretation of § 1981 at the time, the statute has changed 
since the Jett ruling. Therefore, courts should consider § 1981 anew, 
without strict adherence to Jett. Most importantly, when determin­
ing the current scope of § 1981, courts should reject a reading of the 
amended statute that would perpetuate the faulty logic used in Jett. 
This Note will argue, based on plain text and the modern im­
plied remedy doctrine, that Congress overturned both of Jett's rul­
ings. Therefore, § 1981 as amended should be read as providing 
remedies independent of § 1983 and allowing for respondeat supe­
rior liability. Part II will give the background of the controversy, 
including the history of §§ 1981 and 1983, the Jett decision, and the 
circuit split. Part III will argue that the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
holding that § 1981 provides a claim independent of § 1983 when 
brought against municipalities. Furthermore, this section will urge 
courts to read § 1981 as also allowing for respondeat superior liabil­
47. This is not to imply that an independent § 1981 would be insignificant to civil 
rights litigants-quite the contrary. In Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither states nor state officials acting in their 
official capacity were "persons" subject to liability under § 1983. Id. at 71. Because 
§ 1981 does not limit its application to "persons," civil rights litigants after the Will 
decision would theoretically have been able to bring § 1981 actions against states and 
state officials as a (much narrower) alternative to a § 1983 claim: as long as states 
waived sovereign immunity, § 1981 suits would have been possible. See id. at 66. After 
Jett, however, this was no longer a possibility because § 1981 was held to be a guarantee 
of rights without a remedial structure. lett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 701 
(1989). Requiring § 1981 actions to be brought through § 1983 prevented litigants from 
bringing either action against states or state officials acting in their official capacity. See, 
e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment 
Under Title VII, 56 BROOK L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1991). Federation ofAfrican-American 
Contractors, the Ninth Circuit'S decision, is significant for this reason: if § 1981 now 
provides an implied remedy, then § 1981 suits are not limited to "persons," and can be 
brought against states and state actors acting in their official capacities. This Note, 
however, is concerned with municipal liability under § 1981. 
Two points are worth noting. First, Will does not impact Monell because the Elev­
enth Amendment does not apply to municipalities. Will, 491 U.S. at 70. Second, state 
officials may be sued in their individual capacity, even when acting within the scope of 
their official authority. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). 
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ity against municipalities, as this reading is faithful to the original 
purpose of the statute, as well as its most recent renewal in 1991. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of §§ 1981 and 1983 
1. The Origins of § 1981 
Despite the lofty aspirations of its enactors,48 the Thirteenth 
Amendment did not by itself grant equal protection to newly eman­
cipated slaves.49 Shortly after the Civil War ended, Southern states 
enacted the Black Codes, some of which criminalized "vagrancy" 
and allowed whites to purchase vagrants' labor for a term of bond­
age.50 Other laws allowed whites to take children from "unfit" 
freedmen and force them to labor until adulthood.51 Although the 
Black Codes were effectively dealt with by the Freedmen's Bureau 
and the Union Army,52 the enactment of such laws reflected the 
South's desire to maintain slavery in practice, if not in fact.53 
48. Calling it "the joyous 'consummation of abolitionism,' the Congress that 
passed the Thirteenth Amendment fully intended it to protect all men, "fully and 
equally in the enjoyment of all the essential rights which ... constitute freedom." Jaco­
bus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consum­
mation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L.REv. 171, 173-76 
(1951). 
49. See, e.g., Vada Berger et a\., Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to Mc­
Cleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 437, 443-44 (1989); Henry L. Chambers, 
Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1405 
(2002); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amend­
ment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 584-85 (2002); Timothy Zick, Angry White 
Males: The Equal Protection Clause and "Classes of One", 89 Ky. L. J. 69, 92 (2000­
2001). See also Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against Ra­
cially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.c. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARV. 
c.R.-c.L. L. REv. 689,709 n.68 (1986) (citing Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3,25 (1883), who stated: "the enjoyment of equal rights ... has become estab­
lished by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
(which merely abolishes slavery) but by force of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments"). 
50. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a 
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1015 n.188 (2002) (citing 
DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAV­
ERY (1978» (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to do much more 
than emancipate slaves-it was intended to embody the full realization of the founders' 
original ideals of freedom for all human beings). 
51. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL 
RIGHTS (Part I) 24 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Chelsea House 1970). 
52. Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstructions, Reconstruction History, and the 
Proper Scope of Section 1981,98 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1989). 
53. See id. at 549-50. Sullivan quotes Major General Carl Schurz as saying: 
The general government of the republic has, by proclaiming the emancipation 
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But according to General Oliver O. Howard, the head of the 
Freedmen's Bureau, most discrimination resulted not from statutes, 
but from private actions: whites refused to contract with freedmen, 
used corporal punishment in employment, and generally made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the freedmen to acquire labor con­
tracts on a fair basis or to purchase or hold land.54 Moreover, indi­
vidual racism made it unlikely that freedmen would have access to 
judicial protection in the Southern states. As Justice Strong ex­
plained: "It is . . . well known that in many quarters prejudices 
[exist] against the colored race, which naturally [affect] the adminis­
tration of justice in the State courts ...."55 Despite the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the vestiges of slavery still clung to the institutions of 
the South.56 
The Act of 1866,57 the first national civil rights statute,58 was 
of the slaves, commenced a great revolution in the south, but has, as yet, not 
completed it. Only the negative part of it is accomplished. The slaves are 
emancipated in point of form, but free labor has not yet been put in the place 
of slavery in point of fact[.] 
Id. 
54. See John Hope Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1135, 1141 (1990) (giving brief history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in light of the 
Supreme Court's reconsideration of Runyon); Sullivan, supra note 52, at 554-55 (stating 
that former masters often did not refuse to contract with freedmen, but insisted on 
"labor contracts" that placed the freedmen in a position of "practical slavery"). 
55. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1871). 
56. See George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A 
Commentary, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 788 n.192 (1992); Tsesis, supra note 49, at 559; 
James Thomas Thcker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of the Consent Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 473 (1999); Lea S. 
Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 
441 n.22 (1989) (stating that the Emancipation Proclamation had no impact on the 
slaves held in states like Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, or Delaware). 
57. The first section of the Act of 1866 conferred rights, while the other sections 
dealt with enforcement of those rights. Section one of the Act read: 
That all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign 
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the 
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery, ... shall have the same right in every state and 
territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par­
ties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell and convey real and personal 
property; and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 786 (C.C.D. Ken. 1866) (No. 16,151). 
58. For an exceptionally detailed account of the legislative debates on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Seg­
regation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11-30 (1955). 
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passed in response to the Thirteenth Amendment's inability to ade­
quately protect the rights of the freedmen.59 In essence, this Act 
was intended to provide the mechanism by which to accomplish the 
ideals of the Thirteenth Amendment.60 This monumental yet often 
forgotten statute not only granted the freedmen citizenship status,61 
it also protected their right to purchase and sell real estate, testify 
against white defendants in federal court,62 and to acquire employ­
ment on an equal basis with their white neighbors.63 Section 1981 is 
derived from section one of the Act of 1866.64 
2. 	 Early Judicial Construction of the Scope of the Act of 
1866 
Since its passage, the legal community has debated the proper 
59. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 794 (even after the Thirteenth Amendment, "[s]lavery, 
in fact, still subsisted in thirteen states. Its simple abolition, leaving [racist state] laws 
and this exclusive power of the states over the emancipated in force, would have been a 
phantom of delusion"). 
60. 	 Blyew, 80 U.S. at 595-96. 
61. SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 100. The citizenship clause was intended to re­
spond to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), in which the Supreme 
Court held it had no jurisdiction to hear Scott's case because he was a slave, and there­
fore not a citizen of the United States. Id. at 475-76. The Court wrote: 
It may be assumed as a postulate, that to a slave ... there appertains and can 
appertain no relation, civil or political, with the State or the Government. He 
is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the interests, the con­
venience, or the will, of his owner; and to suppose ... the existence of any 
privilege or discretion, or of any obligation to others incompatible with the 
magisterial rights just defined, would be by implication ... to deny the relation 
of master and slave, since none can possess and enjoy, as his own, that which 
another has a paramount right and power to withhold. 
Id. 
Granting citizenship status to freedmen, therefore, would be tantamount to creat­
ing a protective relationship with the government that slaves had lacked. See Abel A. 
Bartley, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Great Equalizer of the American People, 36 
AKRON L. REv. 473, 485 (2003); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutional
ism in the Era of Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 872 (1986). 
62. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (declaring the Act of 1866 constitutional under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and affirming a black woman's right to testify against the white 
man who robbed her, despite a Kentucky law prohibiting black persons from testifying 
against white persons). 
63. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 589. In tracing the purpose of the Act of 1866, the Court 
wrote: 
In this age no man can be called free who is denied the right to make con­
tracts, sue and be sued, and to give evidence in the courts. . .. So long as he is 
denied the right to testify against those who violate his person or his property 
he has no protection, and is denied the power to defend his own freedom. 
/d. 
64. 	 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 161 (1976). 
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scope of the Act of 1866. United States v. Rhodes65 was the first 
case to consider the Act.66 Rhodes, a white man, robbed the home 
of Nancy Talbot, a black woman and a resident of Kentucky.67 
Under state law, Talbot was not allowed to testify against Rhodes,68 
so she tried to pursue her case in federal court, where her right to 
testify was protected by the Act of 1866.69 The Circuit Court held 
that it had jurisdiction to hear this case because one of the purposes 
of the Act was to allow the federal government to protect the rights 
of black citizens when these rights were violated by states.70 Su­
preme Court Justice Swayne, riding the circuit, recognized that 
Congress intended the Act of 1866 to be a wide-sweeping response 
to an insidious problem and advocated a liberal application of the 
terms of the Act.71 Swayne's was a reasonable interpretation: the 
plain language of the Act of 1866 was broad and without limitation, 
and only covered a narrow range of conduct.72 
However, the Supreme Court, which appears to have been un­
comfortable with the Act's broad scope from the very beginning,73 
narrowed its application several years later in another Kentucky 
case, Blyew v. United States .74 This particularly heinous hate crime 
involved the axe murder of Jack and Sallie Foster, a married couple, 
Richard, the couple's seventeen-year-old son, and Lucy Armstrong, 
Sallie Foster's blind, ninety-year-old mother.75 Richard Foster sur­
vived two days after the attack-long enough to identify the de­
fendants: two white men.76 Laura Foster, the couple's thirteen­
year-old daughter, witnessed the crimes and managed to escape 
65. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ken. 1866) (No. 16,151). Rhodes concerned the scope 
of the third section of the Act of 1866, which gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdic­
tion of "all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied, or cannot en­
force in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state ... any of the rights secured to them 
by the first section of this act ...." Id. at 787. 
66. Tsesis, supra note 49, at 578. 
67. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 785. 
68. Id. at 785-86. 
69. The Act of 1866 gives all citizens the equal right to testify in court. Id. at 786. 
70. Id. at 787. 
71. Id. at 788 ("We regard [the Act of 1866] as remedial in its character, and to be 
construed liberally, to carry out the wise and beneficent purposes of congress in enact­
ing it. "). 
72. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
73. See Tsesis, supra note 49, at 577 ("Initial judicial interpretations of federal 
civil rights statutes emaciated the [Thirteenth] Amendment's potential uses for human 
rights reform."). 
74. 80 U.S. 581 (1871). 
75. Id. at 584-85. 
76. Id. at 585. 
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unharmed.77 
Because the defendants were white, Kentucky state law pro­
hibited Richard and Laura Foster's testimony, so the Attorney 
General of the United States sought to remove this case to federal 
court under the Act of 1866. The Act gave the right of removal 
only to those who were "affected" by a case,78 and the Supreme 
Court determined that only parties to an action could properly be 
deemed "affected."79 Because this was a criminal matter, then, the 
defendants were affected, and the government was affected.80 The 
Court reasoned that if the scope of protection in a criminal action 
was extended to every witness or potential witness, then every crim­
inal proceeding would fall under federal jurisdiction.81 As this 
could not have been Congress' intent, the Court determined that in 
a criminal suit, victims were considered "affected," but witnesses 
were not.82 As applied to this case, the only persons who had been 
"affected" by this crime were dead, and deceased persons did not 
fall within the contemplated scope of the Act of 1866.83 The tragic 
result of this ruling was that the case had to be tried in state court 
without the benefit of eyewitnesses. Because of racist state laws, 
Richard Foster's deathbed identification of his murderers was inad­
missible, as was Laura Foster's eyewitness testimony of the slaugh­
ter of her entire family. Surely, this could not have been what 
Congress had intended. 
From the very first Act of 1866 cases, then, it is clear that its 
proper scope has always been a point of contention. It is also clear 
that since 1871, the Supreme Court has made a sport of this contro­
versy, placing its enjoyment of word games above the obvious pur­
pose of the Act. 
77. Id. 
78. Section three of the Act of 1866 read: 
That the District Courts of the United States, within their respective districts, 
shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all 
crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also con­
currently with the Circuit Courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and 
criminal, affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or 
judicial tribunals of the State, or locality, where they may be, any of the rights 
secured to them by the first section of the act. 
Id. at 582 (emphasis omitted). 
79. Id. at 591. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 591-92. 
82. Id. 
83. See id. at 593-94. 
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3. The Origins of § 1983 
Section 1983 was derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, or the Ku Klux Act.84 The Ku Klux Act was passed in re­
sponse to a rash of Klan violence against freedmen and their white 
supporters in the former Confederate states.85 William Stoughton, 
a Republican from Michigan, expressed concern over the Southern 
states' inability to control the violence,86 and ultimately the House 
and Senate voted to adopt a law that would allow the federal gov­
ernment to use force to protect the civil rights of those who were 
being terrorized. Section 1 of the adopted Ku Klux Act, modeled 
after § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, gave federal courts juris­
diction to hear cases involving federal and constitutional rights vio­
lations by persons acting "under color of law," and provided victims 
with a civil cause of action.87 Section 7 of the Act detailed that 
nothing in the 1871 Act should be construed to repeal any former 
act.88 
Section one of the Ku Klux Act was passed exactly as intro­
duced in both the House and Senate.89 This fact is significant-it 
should be noted that § 1 had already been passed when Congress 
84. See Achtenberg, supra note 10. 
85. Id. at 7. 
86. CONGo GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1871). Stoughton said: 
When thousands of murders and outrages have been committed in the south­
ern States and not a single offender brought to justice, when the State courts 
are notoriously powerless to protect life, person, and property, and when vio­
lence and lawlessness are universally prevalent, the denial of the equal protec­
tion of the laws is too clear to admit of question or controversy. 
Id. 
87. Section one of the Ku Klux Act reads in part: 

That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage of any State, shall subject ... any person within the jurisdic­

tion of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu­

nities secured by the Constitution ... shall ... be liable to the party injured in 
any action at law ... such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or 
circuit courts of the United States. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 593. 
88. Section seven of the Ku Klux Act read: 
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to supercede or repeal any 
former act or law except so far as the same may be repugnant thereto; any 
offences heretofore committed against the tenor of any former act shall be 
prosecuted, and any proceeding already commenced for the prosecution 
thereof shall be continued and completed, the same as if this act had not been 
passed, except so far as the provisions of this act may go to sustain and vali­
date such proceedings. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 596 (emphasis added). 
89. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978). 
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began debating the infamous Sherman Amendment.9o 
4. The Sherman Amendment91 
The Sherman Amendment, named for its author, Senator John 
Sherman, was not intended to alter § 1 of the Ku Klux Act (the 
section that was later adopted as § 1983),92 but to be added as an 
additional section.93 The Sherman Amendment went through a to­
tal of three versions94 before finally being adopted as what is now 
known as 42 U.S.c. § 1986.95 
The first version of the Sherman Amendment allowed victims 
of racially-motivated violence to recover from the inhabitants of the 
city or town in which the violence had occurred-essentially, the 
cost of racial violence would be borne by the community.96 This 
version passed the Senate, but was rejected by the House.97 
Sherman then produced the second, highly controversial ver­
sion of his amendment. This proposal would have allowed victims 
to recover when injured by "any persons riotously and tumultu­
ously assembled ... with intent to deprive any person of any right 
conferred upon him by the Constitution."98 This second version of 
the Amendment differed from the first in that it would have al­
lowed a victim to recover damages from the county, city, or parish 
in which the violence had occurred, and the government would 
have been liable for the full amount of the award if the victim could 
not collect from the individual wrongdoers.99 Municipalities, there­
90. Id. 
91. This section recounts the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment as 
written by Justice Brennan in Monell. Id. 
92. This section was passed without debate in either the House or Senate. Id. at 
666. 
93. Id. See generally Ken Gromley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A 
Modern Vision of 42 U.S.c. Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1985). 
94. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666. 
95. Id. at 669. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 reads in part: 

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be 

done, and mentioned in [section 1985] of this title, are about to be committed, 

and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, 

neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable 

to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by 

such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have pre­

vented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case .... 

42 U.S.c. § 1986 (2005). 
96. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 667. 
99. Id. 
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fore, could be held liable for the actions of private citizens.100 
Although the Senate approved the second version of the Sher­
man Amendment, it sparked debate in the House.101 In effect, the 
second version of the Sherman Amendment would have required 
municipalities to maintain police forces in order to avoid liability 
under federal law.l02 Representative Blair expressed his concern 
that the second version of the Sherman Amendment would be an 
unconstitutional infringement of states' rights, saying, "[the states] 
create these municipalities, they say what their powers shall be and 
what their obligations shall be. If the Government of the United 
States can step in and add to those obligations, may it not utterly 
destroy the municipality?"103 
Blair's federalism concerns stemmed from contemporary Su­
preme Court decisions holding that the federal government had no 
power to impose peace-keeping obligations on state officers.l°4 
However, these rulings did not prevent Congress from imposing 
civil liability under § 1983 on municipalities that had themselves vi­
olated federally protected rights. 1OS In fact, the issue of civilliabil­
ity was not in question during the Sherman Amendment debates.106 
The House ultimately rejected the second version of the Sher­
man Amendment, and a third was proposed. The third version of 
the Sherman Amendment allowed recovery only from those who 
(1) knew of a conspiracy to deprive others of their civil rights, and 
(2) were in a position to stop the violation from occurring.107 Con­
gress approved the third version of the Sherman Amendment, and 
it is now codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1986.108 Most important to this 
Note was the debate over the second version of the Sherman 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 668. 
102. Id. at 674-75. 
103. Id. at 675. 
104. In Monell Part I, Justice Brennan notes three decisions in particular: Collec­
tor v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (holding that the United States government 
had no authority to tax the salary of a state officer) (overruled); Kentucky v. Dennison, 
65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861) (stating that Congress has no power to impose duties on 
state officers); and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (same). Monell, 
436 U.S. at 675-79. 
105. Id. at 680-81. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, determined that impos­
ing civil liability on municipalities for their own violations of § 1983 was appropriate 
because Congress had not raised this issue during the Sherman Amendment debates. 
Id. at 680-82. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 668-69. 
108. Id. at 669. 
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Amendment, upon which the Supreme Court has relied in order to 
determine how far Congress intended to extend municipal liability 
under § 1983 and § 1981.109 
5. 	 The Sherman Amendment Debates in Action: Monell v. 
Department of Social Services of the City of New 
York110 
The petitioners in Monell were women employed by New York 
agencies that had an official policy requiring pregnant employees to 
take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves became medically 
necessary. Petitioners sued under § 1983, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether local governing bodies 
could be considered "persons" under § 1983.111 
Monell Part I, written by Justice Brennan, is both a reconstruc­
tion of the legislative history of the Sherman Amendment and a 
criticism of the Supreme Court's reliance on those debates to inter­
pret § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.112 Brennan first explained why the 
rejection of the second version of the Sherman Amendment was 
irrelevant to the question of whether municipalities were intended 
to be considered "persons" under § 1983: the Sherman Amend­
ment (1) imposed a radically different form of liability than § 1983, 
and (2) was not proposed as a change to the section now codified as 
§ 1983, but as an addition to the Ku Klux Act.113 
Yet ironically, in Monell Part II, Brennan stated that Congress' 
rejection of the type of vicarious liability imposed by the second 
version of the Sherman Amendment indicates that Congress had 
not intended to hold municipalities vicariously liable for § 1983 vio­
lations committed by their employees.114 From this section, the 
"custom or policy" requirement emerges. Brennan stated that Con­
gress intended to hold municipalities liable for an agent's violation 
of § 1983 only when the agent had acted pursuant to a municipal 
custom or policy.115 
To be sure, Monell Part II was dicta-the only question before 
109. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Monell, 436 
U.S. at 658; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
110. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
111. Id. at 662. 
112. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that municipalities were not "persons" within 
the scope of § 1983). 
113. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664. 
114. Id. at 691. 
115. /d. at 692. 
0 
150 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:133 
the Court was whether municipalities could be considered "per­
sons." But Monell Part II has nevertheless been treated as law; this 
is troubling considering the fallacies upon which the reasoning in 
this section is based. It should be further noted that four of the 
current justices on the Supreme Court have expressed a willingness 
to reconsider Monell.116 
B. 	 Jett v. Dallas Independent School District: The Supreme 
Court Applies Monell Part II to § 1981 
When Norman Jett presented his case to the Supreme Court, 
he asked two questions. First, could § 1981 stand separate from 
§ 1983? In other words, did § 1981 provide an independent claim 
for violations of its provisions? And second, if § 1981 provided an 
independent claim, did it allow for respondeat superior liability, as 
other courts had already held?117 And if § 1981 did not allow for an 
independent claim, then how must it be read? Was it a paper guar­
antee-a recitation of rights without the machinery with which to 
enforce them? Or did Congress actually intend for § 1981 to have 
some teeth? 
Jett conceded that § 1981 did not contain an express claim, but 
argued that when Congress originally passed § 1981-as § 1 of the 
Act of 1866-the prevailing practice was to imply a claim that en­
compassed respondeat superior.118 Therefore, Jett reasoned, even 
without explicit language, Congress had originally intended for 
§ 1981 to provide a claim and to allow for respondeat superior 
liability. 
The Fifth Circuit had held that when § 1981 was brought 
against a municipality, the same limitations that apply to § 1983 
must.also apply to § 1981.119 Under dicta in Monell Part II, a plain­
tiff must therefore show his § 1981 rights were violated as a matter 
of municipal custom or policy. On appeal, Jett tried to separate the 
pairing of §§ 1981 and 1983. Assuming Congress had originally in­
tended for § 1981 to contain an implied cause of action, Jett tried to 
show the Court that Congress had not intended to repeal § 1981 by 
passing § 1983.120 He argued that when § 1983 was passed in 
1871-as the Ku Klux Act-Congress did not explicitly repeal the 
116. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
117. 	 See supra note 23. 
118. 	 Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 712 (1989). 
119. 	 Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 762 (5th Cir. 1986). 
120. 	 See supra note 88. 
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Act of 1866, and "repeals by implication are not favored. "121 
Therefore, Jett claimed, § 1981 must continue to be read indepen­
dent of § 1983, and so limitations placed on § 1983 suits should not 
apply to § 1981.122 The Supreme Court had to determine (1) the 
relationship between §§ 1981 and 1983, and (2) whether § 1983's 
explicit damages remedy controlled § 1981's implied remedy when 
§ 1981 was brought against a municipality. 
1. The Plurality Opinion 
Justice O'Connor wrote the Court opinion, in which Justices 
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy joined. O'Connor relied heavily 
on legislative history in order to craft her response to the issue 
presented-namely, whether § 1981 could provide a federal dam­
ages remedy against municipalities independent of § 1983. 
The opinion begins with the introduction of S.61-the bill that 
would later become the Act of 1866-in 1865, and an examination 
of a proposal by Representative Bingham. Bingham wanted the bill 
sent back to committee with instructions to strike the provisions of 
the bill providing criminal penalties and substitute provisions for 
civil remedies.123 O'Connor noted that Bingham's colleagues 
seemed concerned by this particular solution: they stated that the 
government had a duty to protect its citizens from these violations, 
and a civil remedy would require the "humblest citizen" to maneu­
ver his way through the court system in order to vindicate his 
rights.124 Bingham's proposal was defeated.125 From this, 
O'Connor concluded that the Act of 1866 did not originally provide 
for federal damages, and none was intended by the Congress.126 
Next, the plurality looked at President Johnson's veto of S.61. 
According to O'Connor, President Johnson expressed concern that 
S.61 would hold liable the legislators who passed discriminatory 
laws.127 In response to Johnson's concern, O'Connor noted that 
Senator Trumbull had responded: "Are the men who make the law 
to be punished? Is that the language of the bill? Not at all .... 
Who [is to be punished]? The person who, under the color of the 
121. Jett, 491 U.S. at 712. 
122. Alternatively, Jett argued that § 1981 should be read according to common 
law principles, and in that case respondeat superior would still apply. [d. 
123. [d. at 717. 
124. [d. at 718. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 720. 
127. [d. at 719. 
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law, does the act, not the men who made the law."128 From this 
response, O'Connor concluded, the penal provisions of the Act of 
1866 were constructed to punish the person who acted improperly 
under state law and not "the community where the custom 
prevails."129 
The plurality further noted Johnson's concern that S.61 would 
grant original and exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in all 
matters relating to civil rights.130 Senator Trumbull responded to 
this charge as well, stating that civil rights matters could be brought 
to state courts, but if the state court were to uphold racist state 
legislation, then the party would have the right to remove her case 
to federal court.131 From this, O'Connor concluded that because no 
original federal jurisdiction was created by the Act of 1866, the Act 
"could [not] support a federal damages remedy against state 
actors. "132 
Through an examination of the language of the Ku Klux Act, 
O'Connor stated that "three points are immediately clear": (1) Un­
like the Act of 1866, the Ku Klux Act made liable "in any action at 
law" any "person" acting under color of state law to deprive an­
other of constitutional rights;133 (2) The Ku Klux Act granted origi­
nal federal jurisdiction in order to prosecute state actors;134 and (3) 
Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act was seen as an expansion of the provi­
sions of the Act of 1866 through its new civil remedy for use against 
state actors.135 
The Court looked once again to the notorious Sherman 
Amendment debates. O'Connor noted that the 42nd Congress had 
turned to three earlier Supreme Court decisions to determine 
whether it could impose vicarious liability on municipalities: Col­
lector v. Day, Kentucky v. Dennison, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.B6 
O'Connor quoted Justice Story's opinion in Prigg, which stated that 
Congress could not "insist that the states are bound to provide 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 72l. 
130. Id. at 719. 
131. Id. at 720. 
132. Id. at 721. 
133. Id. at 723. O'Connor noted that the more expansive use of the word "per­
son" opened state and municipal governments to liability. Id. 
134. Id. at 723-24. 
135. Id. at 724. 
136. Id. at 728 (citing Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870); Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 
(1842». 
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means to carry into effect the duties of the national government. "137 
To O'Connor, the Sherman Amendment debates138 revealed Con­
gress' federalism concerns: Congress could not impose vicarious li­
ability on state agencies without the Supreme Court ruling such 
liability an unconstitutional means to enforce federal law.139 
O'Connor concluded by reiterating Brennan's dicta in Monell Part 
II and stating that Congress believed it could only prosecute a state 
or municipality for its own constitutional torts resulting from "offi­
cial municipal policy."14o 
The plurality had made several findings up to this point. First, 
the Act of 1866 had provided neither a federal damages remedy nor 
original federal jurisdiction, and it did not support a claim under a 
theory of respondeat superior. Second, the Ku Klux Act expanded 
on the Act of 1866 by providing a civil remedy, original federal ju­
risdiction, and a claim against "persons," which the Supreme Court 
had decided in Monell Part I could include government agencies. 
And third, the Sherman Amendment debates revealed that Con­
gress did not intend to hold state or municipal governments vicari­
ously liable for discriminatory actions absent a showing that the 
actions were driven by governmental policy or custom. O'Connor 
had only to conclude whether §§ 1981 and 1983 were somehow con­
nected so as to be read together. 
O'Connor wrote that in 1874, Congress had added the words 
"and laws" to section one of the Ku Klux Act so that it prohibited 
"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution [and laws] of the United States."141 Noting that 
there is no explanation for the addition, O'Connor stated that those 
who revised the act cross-referenced the Act of 1866.142 Further­
more, the revisers indicated the laws to which original federal juris­
diction would apply. O'Connor quoted a marginal note which read: 
It may have been the intention of Congress to provide, by this 
enactment [the Civil Rights Act of 1871], for all the cases of dep­
rivations mentioned in the previous act of 1870, and thus actually 
to supersede the indefinite provision contained in that act. But 
as it might perhaps be held that only such rights as are specifi­
cally secured by the Constitution, and not every right secured by 
137. lett, 491 U.S. at 728 (quoting Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616). 
138. See supra Part II, Section A(4). 
139. lett, 491 U.S. at 728-29. 
140. [d. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1976». 
141. lett, 491 U.S. at 729. 
142. [d. at 730. 
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a law authorized by the Constitution, were here intended, it is 
deemed safer to add a reference to the civil rights act.143 
If this marginal note is to be relied upon, then the addition of 
the words "and laws" was intended to insure that the rights guaran­
teed by other civil rights acts would be protected under this provi­
sion and given original federal jurisdiction. To the plurality, this 
marginal note indicated that § 1983 was at least intended to provide 
a remedy for the rights specified in § 1981.144 Therefore, O'Connor 
concluded, § 1983 provides the only federal damages remedy for 
§ 1981.145 In order to prevail in his claim against the DISD, Jett 
would have to prove that his right to contract was violated as the 
result of an official policy or custom.146 The case was remanded in 
order to allow the trial court to determine whether those who had 
violated Jett's rights had acted according to an official policy or 
custom.147 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the court except as 
it relied on legislative history. Scalia believed that the more specific 
provisions of § 1983 should control the more general provisions of 
§ 1981 and that the two statutes, dealing with similar subject matter, 
should be interpreted harmoniously.148 
2. Justice Brennan's Dissent 
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Brennan's dissent is of 
particular interest because O'Connor based her conclusion in lett 
on Brennan's own analysis in Monell Parts I and II. 
Brennan first argued that the plurality decision was hastily 
drafted based on an issue, raised by the respondent, that had not 
been raised in the lower courts.149 Jett, said Brennan, did not have 
enough time to craft a response to the issue, and the Court should 
not decide the matter based on only one side of the argument. 
In countering the plurality, Brennan also relied on legislative 
history. He argued that the Congressional debates on the Act of 
1866 indicate that the legislators' concern was that the bill would do 
143. ld. at 730-31. 
144. !d. at 731. 
145. Id. at 731-32 
146. Id. at 735-36. 
147. Id. at 737-38. 
148. Id. at 738-39. 
149. Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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too little, not too much.150 Noting that Representative Thayer had 
stated that he did not vote for the Thirteenth Amendment with the 
intent that it would be "a mere paper guarantee," Brennan indi­
cated that Thayer had relied on the Act of 1866 as a means of giving 
"practical effect" to the ideals in the Thirteenth Amendment.151 
Therefore, when confronting a question of statutory construction, 
the Act of 1866 should be interpreted broadly, not narrowly.152 . 
The dissenting opinion also took issue with the plurality's claim 
that the question before the Court-whether § 1981 provided an 
independent civil remedy-was novel.153 According to Brennan, 
the Supreme Court had already decided that the Act of 1866 had 
provided an independent civil remedy in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayor 
Co . .154 The Court in Jones wrote: "[Section] 1 [of the Act of 1866] 
was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the 
rights enumerated in the statute, although only those deprivations 
perpetrated 'under color of law' were to be criminally punishable 
under § 2."155 According to Brennan, the holding from Jones indi­
cates that Congress had intended the Act of 1866 to provide a civil 
remedy. The plurality's opinion, which held that the Act of 1866 
did not provide a civil remedy, could therefore only be correct if 
this remedy had been repealed when the Ku Klux Act was passed. 
However, the Ku Klux Act specifically provided that "nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to supersede or repeal any for­
mer act or law except so far as the same may be repugnant 
thereto. "156 Brennan noted that while repeals by implication are 
generally disfavored, they should be regarded with particular "hos­
tility" when the statute itself expressly cautions against such a 
reading.157 
Generally, Brennan opposed O'Connor's reading of § 1981 
through § 1983. He addressed her concern-that allowing respon­
deat superior liability in § 1981 would circumvent legislative intent 
in regard to § 1983-by pointing out that § 1981 had been passed 
150. [d. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
151. [d. at 743-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
152. See id. 
153. [d. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
154. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
155. lones, 392 U.S. at 426. In his dissent, Brennan stated that the plurality could 
only distinguish lones from lett if it recognized that the implied cause of action against 
private persons did not apply to local and state governments. lett, 491 U.S. at 745 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
156. lett, 491 U.S. at 746 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
157. [d. 
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independent of § 1983 and had been designed to cover a much nar­
rower range of conduct.15s Furthermore, Brennan wrote, when de­
ciding in the past whether a statute implied a claim, the Supreme 
Court has never looked to the scope of another statute.159 The 
analysis used in lett therefore not only deviated from methods of 
analysis used by the Court in the past, but it ascribed a Congres­
sional intent that varied according to the way in which § 1983 was 
currently being interpreted.160 
Finally, Brennan responded to the plurality's use of the Sher­
man Amendment debates to determine Congress' intent when pass­
ing § 1981. He noted that the Sherman Amendment "would have 
imposed a dramatic form of vicarious liability on municipalities" far 
different from the liability that would have been imposed through 
§ 1981.161 Also, in relying on the Sherman Amendment debates, 
the plurality was using the point of view of a later Congress to de­
termine the intent of an earlier one.162 
C. The Circuit Split Since the 1991 Amendment163 
Federal and state courts have divided the lett opinion into two 
holdings: first, that § 1983 provides the sole federal damages rem­
edy for actions pressed against a municipal actor, and second, when 
the defendant is a municipality, § 1981 does not allow for respon­
deat superior liability. Currently, the United States Courts of Ap­
peals are split on whether the 1991 Amendments overturned lett's 
first holding by providing § 1981 with an independent federal cause 
of action against local governments. If § 1981 does provide an inde­
pendent cause of action, then it may no longer need to adhere to 
the strict requirements of § 1983. Arguably, if § 1981 does not need 
to be brought through § 1983, it follows that § 1981 may allow for 
respondeat superior liability. 
158. 1d. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
159. 1d. 
160. 1d. 
161. 1d. at 751-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. 
REV. 517, 535-36 (1987) (pointing out that the Sherman Amendment would have im­
posed a much broader form of liability than the common-law respondeat superior 
liability). 
162. Jett, 491 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Consumer Product 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 107 (1980) and United States v. 
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960». 
163. See supra Part I, Section B. 
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1. 	 Courts Finding That the 1991 Amendments Did Not 
Affect lett 
a. 	 Butts v. County of Volusial64 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the language in § 1981(c), 
which protects § 1981 rights against private and state discrimina­
tion, functions only to create a right, not a remedy.165 The court 
noted that according to the legislative history of the 1991 Amend­
ments, § 1981(c) was intended to codify Runyon v. MeCrary166 so as 
to allow § 1981 to protect against private actions. However, noth­
ing was said about lett. 167 Therefore, the 1991 Amendments left lett 
intact. 
b. 	 Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss.168 
When determining whether the court should imply a claim 
against state actors under § 1981, the Fifth Circuit stated that § 1983 
already controlled such claims, so there was no need to imply 
one.169 Addressing the legislative history of the 1991 Amendments, 
the Fifth Circuit stated that Congress' intent was to codify an im­
plied claim against private actors, but there was no intent to imply a 
claim against municipalities because these actions were already cov­
ered by § 1983.170 
2. 	 The Ninth Circuit: lett Was Partially Overturned by the 
1991 Amendments 
The 1991 Amendments did not explicitly provide § 1981 plain­
tiffs with an independent claim against municipalities. However, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the 1991 Amendments never­
theless imply an independent federal claim against municipalities in 
164. 222 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2000). 
165. Id. at 894. 
166. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon involved a group of black schoolchildren who 
were allegedly denied admission to private schools because of their race. The Court 
held that § 1981 applied to private action. See Hodge, supra note 39, at 814 n.98.; 
Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does it Mean and What is its 
Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 304 (1992). 
167. Id. 
168. 246 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2001). 
169. Id. at 463. 
170. Id. This Note will not address the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dennis v. 
County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1995), because this court simply held that lett 
was unaffected by the 1991 Amendments, without offering an analysis of the issue. Id. 
at 156 n.1. 
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Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland.l7l 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit applied the four-factor test 
created by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.172 The Cort test, 
which is used to determine whether a statute implies a claim, asks 
four questions: 
(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose "especial benefit" 
the statute was enacted; that is, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? (2) Is there any indication of legis­
lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
to deny one? (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 
(4) Is the claim one traditionally relegated to state law ... , so 
that it would be inappropriate to infer a claim based solely on 
federallaw?173 
The Ninth Circuit explained that the modern implied remedy 
doctrine, which began with Cart, really centers around one ques­
tion: Did Congress intend, either expressly or by implication, to 
provide a private claim?174 In answering this question, one must 
look to "the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the 
legislative scheme of which the statute is a part."175 The following 
is a summary of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of § 1981 using the Cort 
test, which it called the "touchstone of the modern implied remedy 
doctrine. "176 
a. 	 Does § 1981, as amended, create a federal right in favor of 
plaintiffs with claims against municipalities? 
In Cort v. Ash, the Court emphasized that if Congress has pro­
tected the rights of a certain class of persons, then it is not necessary 
to uncover actual evidence of Congress' intent to provide a private 
federal remedy in order to imply such an actionP7 Rather, the 
more significant inquiry is whether Congress has explicitly intended 
171. 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996). 
172. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Ninth Circuit recognized that de­
spite Justice Scalia's statement in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988), that 
Cart had been "effectively overruled," Id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring), the Supreme 
Court continues to apply the Cart test. Fed'n ofAfrican-American Contractors, 96 F.3d 
at 1211 n.15 (citing Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992». 
173. Cart, 422 U.S. at 78 (internal quotations omitted). 
174. Fed'n of African-American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,575 (1979». 
175. Id. at 1211 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568, 571-72). 
176. Id. 
177. Cart, 422 U.S. at 82. 
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to deny a private cause of action to certain protected groups.178 
The presence or absence of words of limitation is highly important 
when determining whether a statute implies a remedy. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the amended text of 
§ 1981 does not explicitly provide an independent claim. However, 
§ 1981(c) specifies, without using words of limitation, that the stat­
ute protects "against impairment by nongovernmental discrimina­
tion and impairment under color of State law.. "179 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that this provision suggests that Congress in­
tended plaintiffs with claims against municipalities to bring § 1981 
actions independent of § 1983.180 
b. 	 Was there legislative intent, either explicit or implicit, to create 
or deny such a remedy? 
The court again relied on the text of § 1981(c) to answer this 
question, noting that the language of the text indicates that Con­
gress intended § 1981 rights to be similarly protected against both 
state and private actors.181 To determine the extent to which rights 
against state actors are protected, the court looked to Congress' in­
tent in protecting rights against private actors.182 
One of the purposes in amending § 1981 was to codify Runyon, 
thus ensuring that § 1981 rights would be protected against private 
actors.183 In essence, Congress' intent in adding § 1981(c) was to 
codify an implied claim: the text of § 1981 still does not expressly 
provide a claim against private actors, and yet, the clearly stated 
purpose of the amendment was to provide one.184 By analogy, it 
would not be unreasonable to imply a claim against municipal ac­
tors based on Congress' instruction to apply § 1981 equally to state 
and private actors.185 The Ninth Circuit inferred from Congress' 
equal treatment of state and private action in § 1981(c) that Con­
178. [d. The Court states, "in situations in which it is clear that federal law has 
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to 
create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of 
action would be controlling." [d. 
179. 42 U.S.c. § 1981(3) (2004). 
180. Fed'n of African American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1211. 
181. [d. at 1213. 
182. [d. 
183. Fed'n of African-American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1213. 
184. [d. 
185. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 1981(c) ("The rights protected by this section are pro­
tected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under 
color of State law. "). 
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gress intended to codify an implied claim against state actors.186 
c. 	 Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme to imply such a remedy? 
According to the court, Congress had cited as one of its pur­
poses in passing the 1991 Amendments its desire to provide "appro­
priate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful 
harassment in the workplace."187 The Ninth Circuit determined 
that implying an independent claim against municipal employers 
would advance this purpose.188 Furthermore, the court was com­
fortable implying an independent claim because doing so would do 
little to actually alter the state of the law-essentially, plaintiffs 
would simply no longer be required to bring a § 1981 action 
through § 1983.189 
d. 	 Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law? 
The Ninth Circuit noted that federal civil rights actions are not 
an area traditionally relegated to state law.190 The court also stated 
that these statutes-§ 1981 and § 1983-were originally passed to 
remedy civil rights abuses perpetrated by state actors.191 Therefore, 
it would not conflict with traditional notions of federalism to imply 
a federal remedy in this case. l92 
Based on its application of the Cort test, the Ninth Circuit con­
cluded that it is appropriate to imply an independent claim in 
§ 1981 when the claim is being brought against a municipality. 
However, implying an independent claim does little to alter the 
state of § 1981 or to restore it to its position before Jett. 193 The real 
harm in the lett ruling came from the Supreme Court's determina­
tion that § 1981 did not allow for respondeat superior liability. Ab­
sent any direction from Congress, the Ninth Circuit declined to rule 
that § 1981 now allows this type of liability.194 To buttress its deci­
sion, the Ninth Circuit noted that § 1981 was amended by the words 
186. Fed'n of African-American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1213. 
187. Id. at 1214 (citing § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. This conclusion assumes that the "custom or policy" requirements of 
§ 1983 would continue to apply to § 1981, despite its independence from § 1983. 
190. Id. 
191: Id. 
192. Id. 
193. But see supra note 47. 
194. Fed'n of African-American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1215. 
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"under color of law"-language taken from § 1983.195 Based on 
this borrowed language, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress 
intended to extend § 1983's custom or policy requirement to § 1981. 
Several lower courts have agreed with the Ninth Circuit and 
have determined that § 1981 provides an independent federal claim 
when brought against state actors.196 However, the majority of 
courts confronted with this question have disagreed'with the Ninth 
Circuit, each hesitating to deviate from the Jett ruling without ex­
plicit direction from Congress indicating its intent to overrule 
Jett. 197 
III. ANALYSIS 
When considering the current state of the debate over the 
modern scope of § 1981, it is perhaps best to use a baseball analogy. 
Imagine a team of courts attempting to reach "home," which for 
purposes of this analogy is the proper interpretation of § 1981 
based on its text, purpose, and legislative history. The Fourth, Fifth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have gone to bat, but have struck out: they 
have continued to rely on Jett, which was a holding based on the 
statute before it was modified by the 1991 Amendments. The Ninth 
Circuit has fared a little better and has hit a single, perhaps even a 
double. However, no one has yet hit a home run. Section 1981 is 
still misunderstood. 
If the courts are going to finally fulfill the intended purpose of 
§ 1981, Jett and Monell Part II can no longer be relied upon. First, 
Brennan's "custom or policy" language in Monell Part II was not 
just dicta; it was wrong.198 O'Connor's reliance on the dicta in Mo­
nell Part II when deciding Jett was therefore misplaced. Further­
more, it is worth noting that Brennan himself did not rely on 
Monell Part II in deciding Jett. In fact, Brennan adamantly opposed 
a Monell Part II reading in his dissent.199 
But even if the flaws in Monell Part II and Jett are overlooked, 
195, ld, 
196. See Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 143 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D.Mass. 2001); Jack­
son v. City of Chicago, No. 96-C3636, 1996 WL 734701, at *8 (N.D.IlI. Dec. 18, 1996); 
Robinson v. Town of Colonie, 878 F. Supp. 387, 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Arnett v. Davis 
County Sch. Dist., No. 92-C988W 1993 WL 434053, at *5 (D. Utah Apr. 5, 1993); Ford 
v. City of Rockford, 88-C20323, 1992 WL 309603, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 15, 1992). 
197. See supra note 43. 
198. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("Part II of Monell contains dicta of the least persuasive kind."). 
199. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 748-49 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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Jett involved an analysis of § 1981 before it was amended. One can 
continue to read Jett as a reasonable interpretation of § 1981 as it 
existed before the 1991 Amendments and still conclude that Jett no 
longer applies to the amended statute. This section will examine 
the text, purpose, and legislative history of § 1981, and it will urge 
courts to read the amended § 1981 as (1) implying an independent 
federal remedy against municipalities, and (2) allowing for respon­
deat superior liability. 
A. 	 The Consequences of Municipal Liability Under § 1981 
At first, interpreting § 1981 so as to allow for respondeat supe­
rior liability may seem to open the proverbial floodgates: such lia­
bility has the potential to burden local governments and local 
taxpayers. But these fears should be alleviated when one considers 
the narrow scope of § 1981. Unlike § 1983, which can be applied to 
a wide range of conduct, § 1981 protects citizens from racial dis­
crimination in contracts.200 To be sure, § 1981 was intended to be a 
broad civil rights statute and is not limited to employment con­
tracts.201 However, this statute is not nearly as far-reaching as 
§ 1983, and so the same policy concerns should not apply. If courts 
read § 1981 to allow for respondeat superior liability, several stars 
must still align before a municipal employer will feel the conse­
quences: a municipal employee must racially discriminate against 
another municipal employee in the formation or performance of a 
contract, and this discrimination must occur under the actual or ap­
parent authority of the municipal employer. 
Jett already allows for municipal liability when discrimination 
occurs under the actual authority of the municipal employer. Ex­
tending the doctrine of respondeat superior to § 1981 actions would 
only provide additional relief when discrimination occurs under ap­
parent authority. Considering the narrow scope of the statute and 
the rather minor extension respondeat superior would provide, 
there does not seem to be much support for a "floodgates" 
argument. 
B. 	 Analyzing the Circuit Split: Why the Ninth Circuit Got It 
(Almost) Right 
Although the Ninth Circuit currently stands alone, it has 
200. 	 H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (II), at 35 (1991). 
201. H.R. REp. No. 102-40 (I), at 146-47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
549,675. 
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presented the soundest reasoning on the relationship between Jett 
and the 1991 Amendments. The Ninth Circuit has been the only 
federal appellate court to actually apply the Supreme Court's own 
modern implied remedy doctrine in order to determine whether 
§ 1981 was altered. None of the other circuits have even responded 
to the Ninth's use of the Cart test. 
The Fifth Circuit's holding-that a remedy against municipali­
ties should not be implied because it is not necessary-is interest­
ing, but it misses the mark. In the modern implied remedy 
doctrine, the question is one of Congressional intent and not what is 
deemed judicially necessary.202 Therefore, this reasoning should 
not be adopted. 
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning-that § 1981 provides rights 
without providing remedies-is similarly unconvincing. Plaintiffs 
have never been required to bring § 1981 claims through other stat­
utes when litigating a claim against a private actor.203 Therefore, it 
is incorrect to read § 1981 as providing rights without remedies, as 
§ 1981 currently does provide a remedy for those whose rights are 
violated by private actors. 
Jett distinguished between § 1981 actions brought against pub­
lic and private actors. Before the 1991 Amendments, the language 
of § 1981 was neutral as to how it applied to different defendants, 
so distinctions drawn by the courts were perhaps defensible. Now, 
however, the plain text of the statute does not support this read­
ing.204 The language in § 1981(c), which guards rights "against im­
pairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment 
under color of State law," makes no distinction between actions 
brought against private and state· actors. It is incorrect to assume 
that Congress intended § 1981 to be read differently depending on 
202. The Supreme Court has said that the reasons for the modem implied remedy 
doctrine include "the increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased vol­
ume of federal litigation, as well as the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legisla­
tive intent." Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 811 (1986) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 
U.S. 353, 377 (1982» (internal quotes omitted). 
203. See, e.g., Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 78 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished); Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 
(10th Cir. 1995); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 
1986); EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Bank of 
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Williams v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., 78 
F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 1999); Dickerson v. City Bank & Trust Co., 590 F. Supp. 714, 
716-17 (D. Kan. 1984); Jones v. Local 520, Int'! Union of Operating Engineers, 524 F. 
Supp. 487, 492 (S.D. Ill. 1981). 
204. See discussion supra Part I, Section B. 
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the status of the defendant, since there is nothing in the words of 
the statute with which to justify this difference in treatment. The 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits still continue to apply Jett, yet 
fail to explain this anomaly. 
C. 	 The 1991 Amendments Should be Read as Overturning Both 
of Jett's Holdings 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was sound when it used the Cort 
test to hold that § 1981 provides a private remedy when brought 
against a municipality. But the more important question is whether 
the 1991 Amendments to § 1981 allow municipalities to be held lia­
ble under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Does the fact that 
§ 1981 provides an implied independent remedy against municipal 
actors require one to read the statute independent of the § 1983 
"custom or policy" requirements? This Note argues that it is rea­
sonable to find that § 1981 currently allows for such liability, and 
that such a reading is faithful to the original Congressional intent 
and the 1991 Amendments. 
1. 	 An Examination of the Text of § 1981 
The Ninth Circuit stopped short of holding that § 1981 allows 
for respondeat superior liability205 by using the following reasoning: 
the language used to amend § 1981 was borrowed from- § 1983; 
§ 1983 does not allow for respondeat superior liability;206 therefore, 
§ 1981 does not allow for respondeat superior liability.207 An exam­
ination of the language borrowed from § 1983 reveals, however, 
that the Ninth Circuit's holding is unsupported by the language of 
the statute. 
a. 	 The Meaning of "Under Color of Law" 
When Congress amended § 1981, the only language it bor­
rowed from § 1983 was the phrase "under color of law."208 Al­
though the Ninth Circuit concluded that this language indicates that 
Congress did not intend to hold municipalities liable under respon
deat superior, the words "under color of law" really have nothing to 
do with vicarious liability. 
205. Fed'n. of African-American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 
1215 (9th Cir. 1996). 
206. 	 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). 
207. 	 Fed'n. ofAfrican-American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1215. 
208. 	 See supra note 3; supra Part I, Section B. 
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "under color of 
law," as used in § 1983, on several occasions. For example, in 
Monroe v. Pape,2°9 the Supreme Court determined that govern­
ment officials who carry "a badge of authority" act "under the color 
of law" whether or not their behavior is legal.2l0 The Court 
reached similar conclusions in Williams v. United States,211 Screws v. 
United States,212 and United States v. Classic.213 Based on these 
cases, the phrase "under color of law" is not one that traditionally 
implicates the doctrine of respondeat superior. Instead, these words 
instruct courts as to when an individual is a "state actor" who may 
be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of 
another's federal rights.214 Standing alone, the words "under color 
of law" neither bar nor allow for vicarious liability. 
The Ninth Circuit is mistaken when it relies upon this bor­
rowed language to infer that Congress intended to extend § 1983's 
"custom or policy" requirement to § 1981. Despite the Ninth Cir­
cuit's assertion, this phrase did not influence the dicta in Monell 
Part II.215 Essentially, Congress' use of the phrase "under color of 
209. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). James Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago police of­
ficers entered his home in the middle of the night and made him stand naked in his 
living room while they ransacked his personal property. [d. at 169. Monroe was then 
taken to the police station, detained, and questioned about a recent homicide. Id. Dur­
ing the time Monroe was not allowed to call his family or an attorney, and he was not 
brought before a magistrate, although one was available. Id. After ten hours, Monroe 
was released without criminal charges being pressed. [d. Because the Chicago police 
had conducted a warrantless search of his home and had held him without arraignment, 
Monroe alleged his civil rights had been violated and brought a § 1983 action. [d. 
210. [d. at 172. 
211. 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951) (finding that police officers who had beaten a man 
to death in the course of an arrest had acted under color of law because (1) making an 
arrest was within the scope of their official duties, and (2) they had abused government­
vested authority). 
212. 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945) (a special police officer who used force to elicit 
confessions from suspects acted under the color of law). 
213. 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law 
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 
law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."). 
214. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) (holding that individuals us­
ing state-vested authority to deprive another of their civil rights violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
215. Section 1983 will hold liable "[a]ny person who, under color of any law .. . 
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the deprivation of any rights .. . 
secured by the Constitution of the United States ...." 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (emphasis 
added). In Monell Part II, Brennan determined that the phrase "shall subject, or cause 
to be subjected" meant that municipalities could only be liable under § 1983 if (1) they 
directly violated federal rights, or (2) they caused federal rights to be violated through 
official policies or customs. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). 
The phrase "under color of law" was irrelevant to Brennan's analysis. [d. at 692. 
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law" is irrelevant when determining whether Jett remains good law 
and should not be used to analyze this question. 
b. The Plain Meaning of the Text of § 1981 
If the words "under color of law" are not determinative, then 
how should § 1981 be read? As a basic rule of statutory interpreta­
tion, one must begin with the plain meaning of the words used by 
Congress and proceed to legislative history only if that language is 
ambiguous.216 
Section 1981 protects "against impairment by nongovernmen­
tal discrimination and impairment under color of State law."217 The 
plain language of the text indicates that § 1981 will be applied in the 
same way to state and private actors, and there is no language that 
would limit such a reading. So as an initial matter, it seems clear 
that Congress intends to treat state and private actors equally under 
§ 1981. At least, the text does not support the distinction that 
courts currently draw between the two. 
When the defendant is a private actor, plaintiffs may bring an 
independent § 1981 claim.218 Furthermore, courts currently allow 
for respondeat superior liability when a § 1981 action is brought 
against private actors.219 However, under Jett, § 1981 cannot be 
brought against a municipality independent of § 1983, and it cannot 
support vicarious liability. This is ambiguous: if both actors should 
be treated equally, which set of rules did Congress intend to apply? 
Legislative history offers no answer to this question-Jett was 
not discussed during the debates over the 1991 Amendments. 
However, legislative history does make clear that by amending 
§ 1981, Congress had two purposes: (1) to overturn Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union,22o which had narrowed the statute,221 and 
216. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 (1805) ("Where a law 
is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legis­
lature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently 
no room is left for construction."). 
217. 42 U.S.c. § 1981(c) (2004). 
218. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). When the actor is pri­
vate, § 1981 cannot be brought through § 1983 because § 1983 only applies to state 
actors. 
219. See supra note 203. 
220. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
221. In Patterson, the Court held that § 1981 only protected individuals until a 
contract was formed-protection in the course of performing that contract was outside 
the scope of § 1981. Id. at 180. 
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(2) to codify Runyon, which had broadened the statute.222 One 
may conclude that Congress intended to broaden, rather than nar­
row, the powers of § 1981 through its amendment. If Congress in­
tended first to treat state and private actors equally under § 1981, 
and second to broaden § 1981, then the broader "private actor" 
construction of § 1981 should be applied to municipal actors. 
Therefore, in keeping with Congressional intent to expand the pow­
ers of § 1981, it is best to read § 1981(c) as authorizing respondeat 
superior liability in both instances, rather than neither. 
2. 	 Rejection of the Second Version of the Sherman 

Amendment 

The only reason § 1981 exposes state and private actors to dif­
ferent types of liability is because of the Supreme Court's misplaced 
reliance on the Sherman Amendment debates. 
Simply put, the Supreme Court's use of these debates to inter­
pret § 1983 has been widely criticized.223 The very notion that the 
Sherman Amendment debates could give insight to § 1983, a differ­
ent part of the same Ku Klux Act, has been called into question.224 
222. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, reprinted in 
136 CONGo REC. H9552 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990). 
223. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,430 (1997) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Liability For Constitutional Torts, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 627,634 (1999) (stating that it is analytically problematic to read the 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment as "anything more than [the rejection of the] 
actual terms of the ... amendment itself," rather than a rejection of municipal liability 
in general); Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal 
Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L. Q. 409 (1978); Steven Stein Cushman, Munici­
pal Liability Under § 1983: Toward a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34 B.C. 
L. REv. 693, 699 (1993) (the Sherman Amendment was much broader than § 1983); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 482, 516 (1982) (Monell's conclusion, that § 1983 did not allow for 
respondeat superior liability, is unsupported by the rejection of the Sherman Amend­
ment); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Reflections on Monell's Analysis of the Legislative His­
tory of § 1983,31 URB. LAW. 407, 418 (1999) (Sherman Amendment liability was much 
different than the liability imposed by § 1983); Mead, supra note 161, at 525-26 (saying 
it is unlikely that Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment was intended to be a 
rejection of respondeat superior liability, which is much narrower than the type of liabil­
ity the Sherman Amendment would have imposed); James F. Basile et a\., Comment, 
Constitutional Law-Jett v. Dallas Independent School District: The Applicability of Mu­
nicipal Vicarious Liability Under 42 U.S.c. Section 1981,63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 233, 
243 n.87 (1988); William H. Pryor, Jr., Note, The Single Incident Inference of Municipal 
Liability Under Section 1983: City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 60 TuL. L. REV. 874, 881­
82 (1986) (noting that the Sherman Amendment would have involved a very extreme 
form of liability). 
224. See Beermann, supra note 223, at 634. Beermann writes: 

Given the diversity of views within Congress on the desirability of the Sher­
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It would add little to the discussion to simply rehash the already 
voluminous amount of criticism on the Court's use of the Sherman 
Amendment to interpret § 1983. The central criticism, however, is 
important to this Note. Most critics disagree with Monell Part II 
because § 1983 and the Sherman Amendment involved completely 
different types of vicarious liability. 
The second version of the Sherman Amendment proposed a 
radical form of vicarious liability that would have made municipali­
ties liable for private citizens' violations of federal rights.225 Section 
1983, however, is limited to redressing actions of the government 
itself.226 These two sections, although intended for the same stat­
ute, were in essence about very different types of liability.227 
Clearly, there is a practical difference between holding a municipal­
ity liable for the actions of its private citizens and holding it liable 
for the actions of its employees. The rejected versions of the Sher­
man Amendment would have forced municipalities to maintain po­
lice forces in order to avoid liability; § 1983, even when interpreted 
man Amendment, it is particularly dangerous to read the rejection of the Sher­
man Amendment as Congress rejecting anything more than the actual terms 
of the various versions of that amendment itself. In legal reasoning terms, the 
Sherman Amendment debates are no more than dicta regarding the meaning 
of § 1983, and as a matter of statutory construction conventions, efforts to 
discern the meaning of § 1983 from debates surrounding the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment yield, at best, weak arguments. 
Id. at 635. 
225. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 668 (1978). 

226. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni­

ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
See Mead, supra note 161, at 525-26. 
227. Mead, supra note 161, at 525-26; Kaczorowski, supra note 223, at 418. Kac­
zorowski writes: 
The nature of municipal liability under the Sherman Amendment was entirely 
different from that of § 1983. Section 1983 imposes liability on persons acting 
under color of law for their own violations of civil rights. In contrast, the Sher­
man Amendment, in all of its versions, imposed liability for failing to protect 
individuals from civil rights violations committed by others. Unlike § 1983, 
the Sherman Amendment imposed an affirmative duty to protect individuals 
from the wrongdoing of others, whereas § 1983 imposes an affirmative duty of 
care not to violate the constitutional rights of individuals. 
Id. at 419. 
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as allowing respondeat superior liability, imposes no such burden.228 
It makes little sense to conclude that Congress' rejection of the sec­
ond version of the Sherman Amendment, which proposed ex~reme 
forms of liability, was also a rejection of common law respondeat 
superior liability.229 
If the Court's use of the Sherman Amendment to interpret 
§ 1983 is problematic, its use when reading § 1981 is even more so. 
Section 1981 is extremely narrow, covering only a few specific 
rights,230 whereas the Sherman Amendment, and even § 1983, were 
much broader. It simply does not follow from the rejection of the 
Sherman Amendment's broad form of vicarious liability that 
§ 1981's narrow form of vicarious liability would also have been re­
jected. Moreover, § 1981 was originally passed by a different Con­
gress than the one that passed § 1983 and debated the Sherman 
Amendment-it makes little sense to use the intent of one Con­
gress to interpret the intent of another.231 
Furthermore, the text of § 1981 has no limiting language that 
would suggest Congress did not intend to hold municipalities vicari­
ously liable for the actions of their agents. The Court's reading, in 
fact, presents a practical problem: how does one separate the ac­
tions of a government (which can fall under § 1981) from the ac­
tions of its agents (which cannot fall under § 1981)?232 How does a 
government act, if not through its agents? The Court has had to 
create a fiction in order to make this reading viable, saying that 
Congress only intended to hold municipalities liable if discrimina­
tion was a custom or policy. But if the Court's reading of the Sher­
man Amendment is not reliable, then there is simply no good 
support for this reading in the legislative history.233 This reasoning 
should be abandoned as courts look to reevaluate § 1981 in light of 
the 1991 Amendments. 
228. Cushman, supra note 223, at 699 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190 
(1961)). 
229. Meade, supra note 161, at 535-36. 
230. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . ..." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (emphasis 
added). 
231. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 749 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
232. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 236 (1986). 
233. [d. 
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3. Justice Stevens' Criticism of Monell Part II 
Justice Stevens attacked the Court's reliance on Monell Part II 
in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle .234 Stevens noted that the doc­
trine of respondeat superior was widely known and accepted at the 
time Congress passed the Ku Klux Act, and that § 1983 "should be 
construed to incorporate common-law doctrine absent specific pro­
visions to the contrary."235 Stevens cited extensively to William 
Blackstone, who wrote in support of vicarious liability in 1765: 
We may observe, that in all the cases here put, the master may be 
frequently a loser by the trust reposed in his servant, but never 
can be a gainer: he may frequently be answerable for his ser­
vant's misbehaviour, but never can shelter himself from punish­
ment by laying the blame on his agent. The reason of this is still 
uniform and the same; that the wrong done by the servant is 
looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself; and it is a 
standing maxim that no man shall be allowed to make any advan­
tage of his own wrong.236 
Based on this common, contemporaneous understanding of the 
master/servant relationship, it is not at all obvious that Brennan's 
conclusion in Monell Part II was accurate: that Congress' rejection 
of a radical form of vicarious liability was also a rejection of its most 
basic form. 
Stevens noted that the debates over the second version of the 
Sherman Amendment indicated that Congress had "seriously con­
sidered imposing additional responsibilities on municipalities with­
out ever mentioning the possibility that they should have any lesser 
responsibility than any other person."237 Furthermore, § 1983 al­
lows the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to individuals who de­
prive others of federally protected rights while acting under the 
234. 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). An Oklahoma City police 
officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside of a bar in the course of investigating a 
robbery in progress. [d. at 810-11. Tuttle's widow brought a § 1983 suit against the 
officer and the City, alleging her husband's constitutional rights had been violated. Id. 
at 811. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for the officer, who they believed had acted 
with a reasonable belief that Tuttle was armed. Id. at 813. (Tuttle had drawn a toy gun 
from his boot. Id. at 811.) However, the jury found the City liable and awarded $1.5 
million in damages. [d. at 813. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that one could not 
infer that the City had a "custom or policy" of inadequately training its police officers 
based on a single egregious act. [d. at 823-24. 
235. /d. at 838 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). 
236. Id. at 835 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
237. [d. at 839 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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color of law.238 As Stevens noted, individual behavior can only be 
considered "unconstitutional" when the individual act is indistin­
guishable from that of a government employer.239 If individual con­
duct may be attributed to a government employer for purposes of 
constitutional analysis, then it should also be attributed under tort 
law in order to determine liability.240 
Justice Stevens emphasized that stare decisis does not apply to 
Monell Part II because it is mere dicta, and "wholly irrelevant" to 
the Court's holding.241 Stevens concluded by noting that policy 
considerations favor applying respondeat superior liability to mu­
nicipalities for violations of § 1983.242 Stevens acknowledged that 
the fear of bankrupting municipalities was legitimate, but that con­
cern could be easily addressed by Congress by either (1) limiting 
damages, or (2) requiring municipalities to purchase appropriate 
insurance.243 
It should be noted once again, as lower courts face this issue, 
that four current members of the Supreme Court have expressed a 
willingness to reconsider Monell Part II.244 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has never fully understood the broad rem­
edy the nation's first civil rights act was intended to supply.245 The 
first Civil Rights Act was intended to provide the machinery with 
which to enforce the ideals of the Thirteenth Amendment: equality 
for all citizens and the complete eradication of the customs of slav­
ery. Supreme Court decisions narrowing the Civil Rights Act and 
its reenactments have only served to frustrate Congressional pur­
238. Supra Part II, Section B(I). 
239. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 839 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
240. [d. at 839-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
241. ld. at 842-43 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
242. [d. at 843-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens listed several interests in­
volved in § 1983 litigation: "[t]he interest in providing fair compensation for the victim, 
the interest in deterring future violations by formulating sound municipal policy, and 
the interest in fair treatment for individual officers who are performing difficult and 
dangerous work ...." [d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243. [d. at 844 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
244. Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Breyer have also indicated their will­
ingness to overrule Monell. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-31 (1997) (Souter, J., Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liabil­
ity Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 777 
(1999). 
245. See supra Part II, Section A(2). 
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pose, relegating what should have been monumentally powerful 
legislation to a virtual paper guarantee of equality. 
The misunderstanding comes from the Court's over-reliance on 
and misuse of legislative history. The Court has exaggerated the 
significance of the Sherman Amendment debates, and in doing so, 
it has ignored not only the plain meaning of the texts of §§ 1981 and 
1983, but also the plain pro-civil rights intent of Congress. Con­
gress' 1991 amendment of § 1981 provides courts with the ideal op­
portunity to reconsider the Supreme Court's narrowing of § 1981 in 
Jett. Under the modern implied remedy doctrine, courts may easily 
imply an independent remedy into the § 1981 using the Ninth Cir­
cuit's reasoning. Furthermore, courts may imply respondeat supe­
rior liability based on the text of § 1981(c), which reveals Congress' 
intent to treat private and state violators of § 1981 equally. If re­
spondeat superior liability applies to private actors, then it should 
also apply to state actors. This reading is in keeping with Congress' 
desire to broaden § 1981. 
Because there is no constitutional bar to imposing vicarious lia­
bility on municipalities for their own violations of § 1981, it only 
makes sense to hold municipalities liable for the discriminatory ac­
tions of agents acting within the scope of employment. After all, 
how can a municipality discriminate, if not through its agents? In 
the end, the only bar to allowing vicarious liability under § 1981 was 
established by the Supreme Court. This is the definition of judicial 
legislation. 
Allison M. McKeen* 
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